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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this short article is to provide elements for a general discussion on peace economics and its 
potential contribution to economics and economic policy. I first present a discussion on deterrence 
equilibria and consequent allocation of resources. Eventually I expound five economic channels 
through which military expenditures turn to be detrimental for economic development. Finally some 
elements to build a framework for a peaceful economic policy are presented. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The aim of this short article is to provide elements for a general discussion on peace 
economics and its potential contribution to general economics and economic policy. In 
particular, a general understanding of peace economics can result into a change of 
perspective on crucial aspects of economic development. Therefore, to an extent, it also 
contributes to the widespread debate on measures of human well-being alternative to 
GDP. In fact, albeit not suggesting a clear-cut new tool of measurement, this article 
aims to provide novel insights and interpretations that can reconstruct a framework of 
reasoning intended to contribute effectively to a process of societal and economic 
development in the long run.   
 As point of departure we may consider the very fabric of societies, namely the 
institutions. In recent years economists have paid an increasing attention to 
institutions governing socio-economic life and societal development. As it is widely 
acknowledged, by institutions, we mean the set of norms governing the evolution of 
economic life as well as the distribution of both income and power among agents. As 
‘set of norms’ institutions are predicted to shape agents’ behaviour and consequently 
also to favour the production of expectations about behaviour of agents. Then, at a 
certain point in time, the institutional setting of a society can be considered the very 
fabric of future economic development. Whereas this idea is widely accepted, less 
agreement has been reached on the sources of institutions. In what follows, the 
conceptual approach of this work is that conflict and peace are to be considered as 
institutions, namely as social norms in themselves. Therefore, they shape long-run 
development of societies and stability of polities. Stated differently, dealing with peace 
and conflict ought to become a crucial theme for economists and policy-makers who are 
willing to secure a prosperous development of societies in the long-run. In this respect, 
it is worth citing the first lines in the preface of North et al. (2009) «[…] The absence of 
a workable integrated theory of economics and politics reflects the lack of systematic 
thinking about the central problem of violence in human societies. How societies solve 
the ubiquitous threat of violence shapes and constraints the forms that human 
interaction can take […]1».  The lack of systematic research on different aspects and 
sources of either collective or individual violence have actually led economists to 
underestimate the impact of unproductive burden of conflicts either actual or potential 
at both micro and macro levels. Peace economics attempts to fill this gap and 
eventually to go beyond in order to design economic policies able to reinforce the 
existence of long-lasting peaceful scenarios.    
The article proceeds as follows: in the next section a discussion on deterrence 
equilibria and consequent allocation of resources is presented; in a third section, I 
expound five economic channels through which military expenditures turn to be 
detrimental for economic growth; eventually, some elements to build a framework for a 
peaceful economic policy; the last section summarizes and presents insights for further 
research.  
 
2. DETERRENCE, BUTTER AND GUNS 
 
Economic agents, either individual or organizations, are likely to be involved in 
interactions other than exchange of goods for money. In fact, behavior of agents is by 
no means bounded to market interactions but it involves a large spectrum of activities 
that are inherently economic because of the resources employed and the impact on 
human welfare. Peace and conflict do belong to this category. Yet, they do exist at both 
micro and macro-level. In the first case, they are the set of non-market interactions 
operated by individuals whereas the latter involve mainly the interplay between 
nation-states.  
In particular, in what follows I take into consideration conflict and peace at macro-
level, namely the international relations between nation-states. In this respect, since 
the Cold War the idea of deterrence has been espoused as guiding principle of 
international relations between nation-states. Needless to say, the bipolar global 
conflict between US and Soviet Union had shaped the context in which the deterrence 
theory was born and developed. Briefly stated, the deterrence theory implies that a 
state implements a policy of deterrence to dissuade the government of another state 
from the use of military force to pursue its own foreign policy goals. In order to do that, 
the first relies upon investments in its own military force and related credibility. Then, 
it is not a case that theory of deterrence has been developed in the Cold War and it has 
been eventually studied following a game-theoretic approach. This also descended from 
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fascination and simplicity of clear-cut non-cooperative game theory and related Nash 
equilibrium which proved to be an elegant and powerful analytical tool for a large 
bundle of human interactions. Furthermore, the desirable property of a Nash-
equilibrium is its stability. So it made it particularly fitting with the desired property 
of a deterrence system. The best-known reference on that is the outstanding seminal 
work by Thomas Schelling in Schelling (1960) and Schelling (1966). The following well-
known line suggests the spirit of the deterrence: «…military strategy is very often not 
[... ]the efficient application of force but the exploitation of potential force….»2. 
Deterrence takes shape in the presence of credible threats. In order to make threats 
credible, agents are predicted to accumulate weapons so in fact generating an arms 
race. An arms race implies some dynamics and can be defined as: the competitive 
resource constrained dynamic process of interaction between two states or coalition of 
states in their acquisition of weapons». (see Intriligator, 1975; Anderton 1989; Isard 
1988, Brito and Intriligator 1984).  
In the demise of the Cold War, the rational study of conflict and its equilibria has 
evolved. Following Hirshleifer (1988), Grossman (1991) and Skaperdas (1992), a 
growing number of scholars have produced a flow of general equilibrium models of 
continuing conflict to depict non-cooperative scenarios in which rational agents 
struggle on the redistribution of potential income. The basic idea of this strand of 
literature is that rational agents – at a given point in time - are endowed with some 
positive resources (say labor and capital) endowments and some technological 
capabilities to be allocated to for both productive and military activities, respectively 
denoted as ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. Then, while struggling over the distribution of a joint 
output, they also make a choice in the allocation of a positive endowment of resources 
between butter and guns. The resulting social state is then shaped by the existence of 
conflict and it is pareto-inferior to a social state with no conflict. The chosen levels of 
resources invested by rational agents exclusively in productive or predatory activities 
determine the social outcome of the conflict. In particular, positive investments in 
military capabilities determine also the redistribution of a contested joint output. That 
is, differently from classical game-theoretic models, the Hirshleifer-style models 
provide insights to predict patterns of economic development. In particular, Hirshleifer 
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and his epigones apply the machinery of game theory to model conflict in a general 
equilibrium setting so predicting the outcome of a continuing conflict3..      
Deterrence systems, arms races and models of continuing conflict all fall into the 
general category of threat systems as theorized by Boulding (1963). Threat systems can 
be punctually defined as interactions between rational agents characterized by the 
existence of credible threats. Threat systems have remarkable effects on economic 
development. They influence the allocation of resources so affecting the development 
path in the long-run. In fact – as noted above - they can be finally interpreted as roots 
of institutions so shaping societal outcomes. Two points need to be highlighted. First, 
stability of threat systems is by no means a necessary outcome. That is, stable 
deterrence equilibrium is not necessarily the sole predictable outcome of a dyadic 
rivalry. In fact, theoretical models of arms races predict stable equilibria only in the 
presence of a specific set of assumptions. Contrariwise, the classical study by 
Richardson (1960) predicts instability of arms races that finally can result into a war 
by means of a system of differential equations. A similar unstable result can be 
obtained by means of a classical game-theoretic approach. Greif (2007) for example 
explains the deterrence equilibrium established in medieval Genoa between rival clans. 
Such equilibrium was characterized by mutual deterrence. The clans continuously 
increased their military strength. In the long run this equilibrium actually became 
unstable precipitating Genoa into social unrest. Then, in the presence of unstable 
equilibria, uncertainty over political stability increases so depressing investments of 
economic agents. Furthermore, it is almost pleonastic to affirm that instability of a 
threat system posits the risk of a severe destructive outcome. In the presence of an 
actual conflict the scenario turns to be dominated by destructive forces. Both human 
and physical capital are destroyed. Finally, societies are worse off not and future 
economic development turns to be severely affected [see Smith (2014); Gates et al. 
(2012); Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008)].   
In fact, albeit not descending necessarily into a war, threat systems imply a heavy 
investment in weapons and military equipment so inflating the investment into 
unproductive activities of societies. In any case, this can lead to a long-lasting economic 
decline. To fully understand this, we have to refer to the classical resource diversion 
argument. In particular, it was Paul Samuelson who first labeled productive and 
unproductive activities ‘butter’ and ‘guns’ respectively. In coining the terms, Samuelson 
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had the experience of Nazi Germany in mind, where the government was actually 
committed to increasing military expenditures (‘guns’) at the expense of civilian 
production (‘butter).  That is, the tradeoff between butter and guns was considered a 
matter of economic policy. More properly, it has to be generalized taking into account 
the theoretical distinction between productive and unproductive activities that dates 
back to Physiocrats and also to Adam Smith. Such distinction evolved from the original 
Physiocrat script but the underlying concept is still valid: there are economic activities 
that can produce individual profits but that are not inherently productive and not 
contribute to the general welfare of the society. A brilliant and concise definition has 
been provided by Bhagwati (1982): «[…]they represent ways of making a profit (i.e., 
income) by undertaking activities which are directly unproductive; that is, they yield 
pecuniary returns but do not produce goods or services that enter a utility function 
directly or indirectly via increased production or availability to the economy of goods 
that enter a utility function. Insofar as such activities use real resources, they result in a 
contraction of the availability set open to the economy[…]4». The argument can be 
generalized by referring to the discussion expounded in Baumol (1990). In that article, 
Baumol explained how historical patterns of development depended heavily upon the 
balance between productive and unproductive activities and on the payoffs rewarded to 
them within different societies. Interestingly, he mentions the Earlier Middle Ages as a 
historical period in which acquisition of wealth was managed essentially by means of 
military activities. Economic development and human welfare were undermined by 
that. In this respect, particularly he remarks that innovation in warfare cannot 
contribute to economic development more than innovations developed in 
manufacturing sector. 
The general discussion posited by Bhagwati and Baumol enriches the classical 
tradeoff between civilian and military activities. In brief, they both consider a set of 
unproductive activities that is larger than that subset including the military 
expenditures only. Please consider rent-seeking. It is a striking example in this respect. 
It is pervasive in many aspects of economic life and it is often a crucial component of 
productive sectors. Albeit not directly destructive it is detrimental for economic 
development. Consequently, it might be possible to maintain that albeit non-military 
some are also inherently unproductive. In general, rent-seeking activities are 
competitive but they are not subject to the free play of market forces. Then, they are 
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contested by rational actors by exerting irreversible outlays (either licit or illicit) or by 
means of actual efforts5.  
If we generalize rent-seeking in a general equilibrium setting, we do capture the 
basic idea of Hirshleifer-style models of continuing conflict and the consequent 
allocation of resources to butter and guns. The main limitation of this class of models, 
however, is that they analyze an oversimplified economy in which there is only one 
productive sector which generates the joint output that eventually is the cake to be 
redistributed by means of guns. In brief, the sole sector of the economy is not subject to 
market forces by definition. With this in mind, it is possible to enrich a Hirshleifer-
style conflict model in order to capture a ‘dual’ economy where duality here refers to 
the distinction between the contested activities and the productive and entrepreneurial 
activities that are subject to market forces.  
The novelty with respect to classical Hirshleifer-style models would be that of 
considering some productive activities that contribute to the final income of agents 
without being contested. In fact, in reality, we can take into consideration that rival 
parties have some income and wealth secure from conflict that generate a positive 
income stream. Indeed, parties do not have to choose exclusively between butter and 
guns.  
Let me summarize and simplify the line of reasoning. We can consider a dual 
economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector, hereafter named uncontested 
sector, each party holds secure property rights over the production of some goods. This 
security of property may descend from institutional guarantees, or could be the effect of 
geographic or technological barriers to would-be predators.  Such secure production can 
assure the holder of a predictable income stream. In a second sector, termed the 
contested sector, agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction 
of a contestable output. With a contested-uncontested distinction, it is possible to state 
that there are at least three possible allocations of resources, namely (i) guns, (ii) 
butter, and (iii) ice-cream. Needless to say, butter and guns denote the classical trade-
off between production and appropriation. Ice-cream denotes all the productive 
activities which are not under threat of appropriation that have to be allocated to the 
uncontested sector. In other words, all the business activities which are subject to 
forces of free market and are not directly affected by the existence of a conflict. Hence, 
there must be a relationship between the choice of resources to be allocated to conflict 
and the choice of resources to be allocated to secure production. The opportunity cost of 
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conflicts would be related not only to the contested production but also to the 
production of goods which are not subject to appropriation (see Caruso, 2012 for an 
analytical treatment).  
Interpreting economies as dual economies characterized by both unproductive and 
unproductive/destructive forces makes clear that patterns of long run-development 
would depend on the balance between butter, guns and ice-cream. That is, the 
uncontested sectors have to be enlarged in order to prevent the society from investing 
excessive resources into violent and military capabilities. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that even if butter and guns can provide some short-term economic boost, they 
are not to secure prosperity and development in the long run. In reality, whereas 
deterrence and threat systems can exhibit economic growth in the short run, only peace 
and enlargement of the set of productive activities can set the pace for a long-run 
development. This ought to be the overarching objective of economic policy.      
 
 
 
3. MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
As noted above, the plausible scenario emerging from a threat system would be 
characterized by continuing reliance on the use of force either potential or actual. That 
is, if considering states and jurisdictions, it would be characterized by the use of 
military force, namely the ‘guns’. It has been argued that this is detrimental for 
economic development. This leads necessarily to mention briefly the discussion on the 
impact of military expenditures on economic development. In fact, the debate has been 
lasting for years. A recent survey by Dunne and Tian (2013) supports strongly the idea 
of a negative effect of military expenditure on economic growth. In general, the 
classical foundations of the debate are: (i) military expenditures employ resources that 
could be employed in more productive uses. (ii) They crowd-out civilian investment and 
production of goods. In what follows, I present some additional refined arguments to 
deepen the overall impact of military expenditures on long-run economic growth. 
Evidently there are different channels through which the detrimental impact of 
military expenditures on economic development takes shape even in times of peace. 
Consider then the following five points: (i) distortion in human capital accumulation; 
(ii) delay in innovation; (iii) loss of productivity; (iv) increase in corruption; (v) increase 
of public debt.  
The first channel envisioned is the distortion in human capital accumulation. This is 
evident in countries where military conscription is in place. In fact, the military draft 
affects youth in a period of life that individuals would otherwise devote to education, or 
first work experiences. The draft likely delays or interrupts this process so determining 
a reduction of human capital available in the economy. Keller et al. (2009) show that 
military draft discouraged enrollment in higher education for OECD countries. In the 
end, this does constitute a serious obstacle for development in the long run. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, many OECD countries have abolished conscription but it is 
still in place in many countries6 among which most low-income countries. In order to 
evaluate properly the impact of military conscription we can refer also to Cipollone and 
Rosolia (2007) that have studied the effect of an exemption from military conscription 
granted to few cohorts of males subsequent to an earthquake. That is, the need of 
reconstruction determined the exemption of males from military conscription. This 
exemption determined an increase of boys’ high school graduation rates by more than 2 
percentage points. In addition, girls’ graduation rate increased by the same amount 
due a peer-effect. In sum, the beneficial impact on schooling has been substantial. 
Needless to say, in the light of this, it is reasonable to say that countries with a 
conscripted army tend to exhibit a lower growth-rate than countries with an all-
volunteer force.  
Second, as military spending includes activities of R&D, the detrimental impact is 
even more complex to be uncovered. In fact, there is widespread argument of potential 
spin-off of military technology into civilian economy. Albeit its popularity this idea has 
no produced any compelling evidence. There are several aspects to be considered. First, 
at a certain point in time, the supply of researchers, scientists and engineers is fixed so 
posing a clear-cut opportunity cost problem. Scarce human resources are allocated to 
military research rather than developing innovation and efficiency in civilian economy. 
In such a case, the tradeoff between military and civilian investments is evident. 
Moreover, military R&D is dominated by secrecy that eventually would increase the 
delay in any innovation. That is, the favorable argument of civilian spin-offs often does 
not take into consideration properly the aspect of timing.   
Needless to say, both distortion in human capital accumulation and diversion in R&D 
activities are likely to determine a significant loss of productivity in the long-run. 
Productivity is a key aspect of economic development. In this respect, a brilliant 
narrative account is Baumol (1986) that studies the long-run productivity from 1870-
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1979. Within a detailed exploration of labor productivity growth, he clearly explains 
the peak in postwar years: […] This encourages reinterpretation of the postwar growth 
period as one of the temporary catch-up, merely making up for opportunities 
previously foregone7[…]. In particular, it is interesting to note that Japan and 
Germany increased their labor productivity respectively by 2480 and 1510 percent from 
1870 to 1979 with the highest rates in the post World War II. That is, productivity 
increased after the war but also after years of excessive military expenditures . With 
respect to Japan, Klein (1961) had explained that the severe cut in military spending 
had enhanced a high growth rate in the postwar period: […]The Japanese military 
economy of the late 1930's led to a form of economic expansion, but its contribution to 
growth has probably been much less than has the peacetime nature of the economy of the 
1950's. The best manpower has been made available to agriculture and industry. […]8.  
That is, productivity losses have been associated with a heavy military spending. 
Punctually Marwah and Klein (2005) estimated that military spending had determined 
a loss in productivity in Southern American countries in the period 1971-1991. Caruso 
and Addesa (2012) highlight that the same detrimental effect on productivity took 
place in Italy from 1988 to 2008.  
An additional concern related to military spending is the positive association with 
higher level of corruption. Gupta et al. (2001) empirically investigated this relation for 
120 countries from 1985-1998. The results highlight that corruption is positively 
associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government 
spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government 
spending. An increase in corruption may be predictable if considering that military 
spending is often characterized by governmental monopsony. In fact, a limited number 
of public officials have a significant power in allocating authorizations and contracts. 
Furthermore, due to national security concerns, military procurement is often less 
transparent than other sectors. This makes corruption easier.  
Lastly, another source of concern is the increasing debt related to military spending. 
In fact, military spending is financed through taxes or by issuing public debt. In 
general, taxes depress economic activity and public debt does constitute a burden for 
future economic growth (Reinhardt et al. 2012). Paleologou (2013) explores the impact 
of military spending on general government debt in EU countries by means of a 
dynamic panel data model. Results suggest impact of military expenditures on the 
share of general government debt in the EU is substantial. Smyth and Narayan (2009) 
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analyze the impact of military spending on external debt in Middle East from 1988 to 
2002. They found that external debt is elastic with respect to military outlays in the 
long run whereas it is inelastic in the short-run. The most interest study is perhaps 
Williamson (1984). He estimates that in England between 1761 and 1820 the capital 
formation share would have been almost 5% higher in the absence of war and the 
national income would have grown by 0.6 per year faster. This evidence is notably 
surprising because that period is usually refereed as the ‘first industrial revolution’. So, 
in spite of the famous labelling, growth figures were actually rather weak. In fact, 
Williamson argues that the enormous debt issued to finance the wars had finally 
crowded-out civilian accumulation. Macro-economic imbalances due to military 
expenditures may also  spillover. Caruso and Di Domizio (2014) analyze the 
relationship between US military spending, and its spillover effect on European 
economies over the period 1988-2013. Results show that the US increase in military 
outlays had a spillover in European scenario raising the level of public debt. 
 
 
4. TOWARDS A PEACEFUL ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
It has been argued that a threat system is detrimental for economic development. But 
how can we define a peaceful economic policy? Hereafter, I continue my analysis 
stating that: by ‘peaceful economic policy’ we can mean an economic policy that 
increases ‘ice cream’ at expense of both ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. That is, it has to increase 
significantly the opportunity cost of a threat system so fostering a stable economic 
development in the long-run. Needless to say, what emerges from the previous 
discussion is that a cut in military spending ought to be considered a paramount policy. 
At the time this article is being written, it appears to be even a more urgent priority. 
The data provided by SIPRI shows an increasing trend in world military spending in 
the latest years. In fact, between 2001 and 2013 world military spending increased by 
49% in constant terms. In this respect US, driven by the war on terror under the Bush 
Jr. administration (2001-2009), had recorded the crucial increase of 76.4% eventually 
followed by an overall decrease by 14% in the following years until 2013. Yet, in the 
period 2001-2013, Russian Federation increased its military spending by 151.8% , 
China by 277.3% and India by 71.6%. Major sources of concern also descend from 
behaviors of many low-income countries. In fact, sub-saharian African countries have 
increased military spending by 85% in the same period and north African countries by 
172.2 as response of Arab authoritarian regimes against the so-called Arab spring. 
Following the argument expounded above, it is clear that a reversal in military 
spending has to be advocated. In this respect, it must be noted that such reversal 
would not be possible in the absence of an effective international cooperation. 
International organizations like UN have to be re-invigorated in order to prevent states 
from developing and acquiring weapons at no cost within international community. In 
this respect, proliferation on nuclear weapons is still a serious threat to world peace 
(see Intriligator, 2011). 
However, albeit essential, the problem is by no means limited to an extensive cut in 
military spending. In fact, a cut in military outlays would refer only to a counterfactual 
state of the world wherein conflict had not taken shape. That is, we can investigate 
what would have been the economic output in the absence of some factors. In our 
discussion, therefore, we may want to investigate what could have been the economic 
performance of a country in the absence of conflict and related factors like military 
expenditures. For 1960 to 2000, Caruso (2003) estimates the loss of potential gains 
from international trade for the United States because of sanctions. In the absence of 
extensive sanctions, trade volumes between the United States and the unilaterally 
target countries would have been larger by 59 percent whereas volumes of other G7 
countries with US-targeted countries would have been larger by 51 percent. Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003) propose a synthetic control methodology to assess the impact 
of conflict on the economy. They use conflict in the Basque regions as case study. They 
found that per capita GDP in the Basque Country declined about 10 percentage points 
relative to a synthetic control region without conflict. Put differently, in the absence of 
conflict, Basque regions would have capable to show an additional 10% growth rate for 
80s and 90s.  
A counterfactual philosophy is also behind the only one measure of peace available, 
namely the Global Peace Index (GPI), developed by the Institute for Economics and 
Peace (IEP), in Sydney. It is a combined score consisting of measurements of 23 
internal and external indicators mostly related to the absence of violence and threat to 
peace. This includes, for example, factors such as violent crime, levels of military 
expenditure. Relating the GPI to economic indicators, Brauer and Tepper Marlin (2010) 
compute an increase in world economic output by about 9 percent, for the year 2007, 
consequent on a simulated counterfactual state of complete absence of violence.  
Nevertheless, a peaceful economic policy needs a novel definition of goals and tools 
that go beyond a negative measure. That is, counterfactual exercises have to be 
accompanied by related positive measures that can be used as clear-cut objectives of a 
peaceful economic policy. Further research is needed on this point. In what follows I 
propose elements for a framework of thinking rather than a precise definition. They 
can be taken into consideration to develop a positive measure of peace. They can be 
listed as follows: (i) democracy; (ii) trade relations and institutional cooperation; (iii) 
investments in education and health. The three pillars listed are to be considered as 
crucial items included in the policy agendas of both national government and 
international organizations.  
The first aspect is related to the types of polities, namely on the institutional regime 
of states. In fact there is compelling evidence that public policies strongly depend on 
type of government. Mulligan et al. (2004) discuss in details the differences between 
democracies and nondemocracies in public spending. Empirical evidence over the years 
1960-1990 shows that nondemocracies spend more in military than democracies. 
Recent and more compelling evidence is in Bove and Nisticò (2014) that show a higher 
degree of military involvement in policy-making increases military spending. 
Interestingly, results presented are particularly stimulating because they are based 
upon the idea that influence of military apparatus varies widely across polities. 
Therefore, the type of government surely matters but it is rather the complex 
institutional machinery that finally influences the decision-making in military. Finally, 
it can be maintained that the need of security is by no means the sole reason to 
increase military spending. That is, apart from security issues, military spending is 
determined because of internal political economy considerations. On the one hand, this 
aspect needs to be taken into account when considering measures for producing a 
reliable measure of peaceful development in the long-run. On the other hand, this shed 
new light on the relationship between democracy and economic development. That is, 
one reason of why democracies appear to foster development in the long-run is also the 
lower level of military expenditures. In recent years, diffusion of democracy has been 
one of the intriguing topics in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
Other crucial aspects of a peaceful economic policy are trade openness and economic 
globalization. In fact, a vast literature had demonstrated that peace and international 
economic integration between democratic countries are positively associated [Polachek 
et al. (2011); Hegre et al. (2010); Reuveny (2000)]. The argument echoes the Kantian 
liberal peace and it is structurally different from deterrence’s underlying theoretical 
construction. Whereas deterrence is grounded  on the idea of a zero-sum game, trade 
and economic integration are based on the idea of positive-sum game. In sum, albeit 
non-cooperative, rational agents are capable to recognize the incentives to trade 
instead of engaging in a continuing conflict. Polachek (1980) provides a formal 
microeconomic model. The model is based on a country social welfare function assumed 
to be derived from the preference sets of the entire population. Following a standard 
trade model, when a country is engaged in a conflict, a restriction in trade fosters a 
deterioration of terms of trade given the impact of conflict on prices. Then, a rational 
government will be choosing an optimal level of hostility that maximizes the welfare 
function given the balance of payments constraint. The equilibrium is reached when 
results of the model that the net cost associated with extra hostility equals the welfare 
benefit of more hostility. So not surprisingly the establishment of a free trade area was 
among the policies suggested in the unheard proposal produced in Keynes (1919/1971) 
in the aftermath of the First World War I.    
Nowadays, although this idea constituted the backbone of European integration after 
the World War II, is becoming a neglected issue in the public discourse because 
protectionist pressures have been inflamed after the great financial crisis occurred in 
2008. Policies followed public discourse. Bussière et al. (2011) find that actual 
protectionist measures have risen in the latest years. The G8 countries, for instance, 
have implemented or announced 186 new protectionist measures between November 
2008 and December 2009. US accounted with 52 measures. In Europe, France, 
Germany, Italy and UK counted respectively for 23, 39, 28 and 27. Notably India and 
Russia count for 46 and 48 respectively. Kee et al. (2013) explains that rise in 
protectionism has taken different shapes. In particular, some countries – Russia, China 
and Turkey - have raised their tariffs significantly whereas US and EU relied more 
upon antidumping measures. Then, also with regard of economic integration, there is a 
compelling urgency to re-launch international cooperation and liberalization. In fact, 
economic interdependence is more beneficial if it is managed under the umbrella of a 
legitimate institution [Caruso (2006); Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000)]. Particularly, in 
Caruso (2006) I developed an analytical model of conflict in which rational parties have 
to choose to be engaged in a continuing conflict or to settle and exchange under the 
umbrella of an institution. In any case, parties rationally invest in guns, but the latter 
scenario would be more peaceful because the aggregate level of guns would be lower. A 
stable Nash equilibrium can be reached if and only if the cost (broadly defined) of 
joining an institution is not prohibitive. Moreover, the model also shows that results in 
terms of peacefulness hold even if the settlement between parties does produce unequal 
gains within certain boundaries. That is, even in the presence of unequal gains from 
trade, countries may still prefer rationally to settle at a lower level of guns rather than 
being engaged in a destructive conflict. In brief, the model suggests that a reasonable 
level of unequal benefits from trade is acceptable if and only if the parties share some 
institutional arrangement. This is inherently a crucial issue because the emergence of 
unequal gains from trade is commonly used by adversaries of liberal theory, to 
highlight risks and deficiencies of economic integration. This aspect is also emphasized 
by Dumas (2011) that mentions it as one of the core principle of a peacekeeping 
economy.  In this respect, it might be argued that the role of WTO becomes crucial. In 
particular, the role of the Dispute Settlement System is the most relevant.   
In sum, commitment to foster trade liberalization has to be in the policy agenda of 
governments committed to peace. Yet, as highlighted above, strengthening of trade 
relations has to be focused on ‘ice-cream’ and not ‘butter’ and related ‘guns’. That is, 
trade openness and trade integration first have to target enlargement of markets for 
entrepreneurial and innovative activities rather than supporting trade of commodities 
and goods that inflate rivalry either between countries or within them between 
competing groups. In fact, since the seminal work by Collier and Hoeffler (1998), a 
large flow of studies have shown empirically that civil wars are mainly caused by the 
violent competition for appropriation of rents related to exports of natural resources. In 
fact, enhancement of trade of uncontested sectors is strongly and positively related to 
productivity. On the one hand, productivity is a powerful engine of trade [see Wagner 
(2007) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) for firm-level evidence]. On the other hand, 
trade liberalization has been found to have a significant on productivity growth.    
In this respect, in our framework, it is necessary to mention investments in human 
capital through education and health. I use the term ‘investment’ in order to remind 
the point raised by Nordhaus (2000) that explains how «…their contribution to 
economic welfare is misclassified because they are largely treated as consumption rather 
than investment…»9. Education, interpreted as an investment in human capital is 
commonly recognized as the main source of improvement in labor productivity. Hence, 
improvement of education at all levels is needed. This is particularly true in war-torn 
and less developed societies. However, in less-developed societies investments in 
education do not suffice. In particular, it is common knowledge that malnourishment 
has a detrimental impact on both current and future productivity. A starving (or ill-
nourished) labourer is less productive than a well-nourished labourer. Moreover, ill-
nourished children will develop fewer cognitive skills which have to be translated in 
productive activity in the future. In recent years, several studies have shown a 
                                                 
9
 Nordahus (2000), p.261 
compelling evidence on the positive impact of health on productivity (see Strauss and 
Thomas, 1998). In many regions, public policies of education and health cannot be 
postponed.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has given a sketch of peace economics and its potential contribution to 
design of peaceful development in the long-run. It has been argued that the problem 
under investigation is inherently institutional. That is, peace is an institution in itself 
that shapes behavior and expectations of economic agents so fostering prosperity and 
development in the long-run. Stated differently, in the eyes of economists peace is an 
institutional scenario in which secure productive activities – the ice-cream – exceed 
both unsecure and contested activities – butter – and the unproductive activities – the 
guns - . In addition, it has been argued that international cooperation and trade 
relations have to be strengthened and balanced. In sum, if we want to elaborate a 
definition along the lines presented in this article we would say that: in economic terms 
peace can defined as an institutional setting that favors productive at expense of 
unproductive activities thanks to democratic governance, balanced economic 
interdependence with other polities and long-lasting productivity growth in the long-run 
determined by investments in education and health.   
In such a way, peace differs substantially from deterrence that plausibly generates 
equilibria in which guns are likely to be increased at the expense of butter and ice-
cream. Peaceful economic policies can be designed to reach equilibria characterized by 
a peaceful allocation of resources. As scientific discipline, the crucial role of peace 
economics is that of providing evidence on costs and losses associated with 
unproductive burden of threat systems (deterrence, continuing conflict and arms 
races). Secondly, peace economics has to normative by contributing either to strengthen 
or to design effective institutions. Then, in sum, peace economics is aimed at designing 
economic policies that would increase uncontested productive activities – the ‘ice-
cream’ - at expense of contested productive ‘butter’ and destructive activities (‘guns’). 
Yet peace economics has to propose models which go beyond deterrence and arms race 
but emphasizes cooperation in order to minimize the unproductive burden of the 
economy. Implicit in this line of reasoning is that peace economics takes the positive 
study of conflicts as point of departure and eventually aims to be a normative science 
as emphasized in Isard (1994), Arrow (1995), Coloumb et al. (2008) and Caruso (2010). 
With this in mind, it is now possible to highlight a proper definition of peace economics 
drawing from the one developed in Brauer and Caruso (2013): « […] Peace economics 
concerns the economic study and design of political, economic, and cultural institutions, 
their interrelations, and their policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve any type of latent 
or actual destructive conflict within and between societies […]».  
Finally, what can be maintained is that peace is by no means disentangled from 
economics and political economy. Further societal progress can be pursued if we 
include peace and its correlates among the factors we have been focusing on over the 
years.  
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